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Abstract
Illegal fishing is prevalent throughout the world and heavily impacts the health of our oceans,
the sustainability and profitability of fisheries, and even acts to destabilize geopolitical relations.
To achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal of "Life Below Water", our ability to
detect and predict illegal fishing must improve. Recent advances have been made through the use of
vessel location data, however, most analyses to date focus on anomalous spatial behaviors of vessels
one at a time. To improve predictions, we develop a method inspired by complex systems theory
to monitor the anomalous multi-scale behavior of whole fleets as they respond to nearby illegal
activities. Specifically, we analyze changes in the multiscale geospatial organization of fishing fleets
operating on the Patagonia Shelf, an important fishing region with chronic exposure to illegal fishing.
We show that legally operating (and visible) vessels respond anomalously to nearby illegal activities
(by vessels that are difficult to detect). Indeed, precursor behaviors are identified, suggesting a
path towards pre-empting illegal activities. This approach offers a promising step towards a global
system for detecting, predicting and deterring illegal activities at sea in near real-time. Doing so
will be a big step forward to achieving sustainable life underwater.
Keywords: sustainable fisheries; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; geospatial intelli-
gence; complex systems; information theory; prediction.
†James R. Watson: College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University; jrwat-
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 is to conserve and sustainably use the
ocean’s resources for sustainable growth (United Nations 2016). This is a vital goal to achieve as
many millions of people rely on the oceans for food and income, and unsustainable use of the seas will
lead to diminished food and income security around the world (Béné et al. 2016). The SDG Target
14.4 is to have the global capacity to effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing by 2020. In
doing so, overharvested fish stocks will then be on a path towards recovery. Sustainable Development
Goal 14 and its specific target can only be achieved if illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing is dealt with (Pramod et al. 2014). This means being able to identify in (near) real-time
IUU events around the world, and even predict their occurrences, all so that enforcement and
intervention can occur more frequently and with more efficacy. Illegal fishing undermines SDG
14 by creating aggregate fishing effort above maximum sustainable levels and potentially creates
geopolitical tension and possibly armed conflict, which have detrimental consequences for regional
development (Österblom and Bodin 2012). Since illegal fishers do not report their catch, their
fishing activities reduce the accuracy of official fish catch and stock estimates and impedes the
ability of regulatory bodies to set catch limits, manage fish populations, and evaluate SDG progress
(Worm and Branch 2012). Further, since their catch is not geographically referenced, their fishing
activities undermine our global ability to monitor marine protection and the health of the oceans
more broadly (Lubchenco and Grorud-Colvert 2015).
Equally important to IUU’s socio-economic impacts are its effects on marine environments: IUU
fishing often causes grave environmental damage, especially when vessels use prohibited gear, such
as driftnets, that catch non-target species (like sharks, turtles or dolphins) or physically damages
or destroys reefs, seamounts, and other vulnerable marine ecosystems. In concert, both the socio-
economic and environmental impacts of IUU has a disproportionate effect on smaller-scale fishers
in developing countries, by stealing fish from near-shore waters and undermining the ecosystem on
which the fish depend (Pauly 2018). Given that illegal fishing is valued at $36.4 billion annually and
represents 20% of the global seafood catch (Sumaila et al. 2006; Stimson Center 2018), there is a
pressing need to be able to detect illegal fishing in a timely manner and at spatial and temporal scales
relevant to enforcement. In doing so, diminished IUU activity will lead to improved geopolitical
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relations in areas where IUU occurs, as well as increases in legal catch and profits (estimated around
14% and 12% respectively; Cabral et al. 2018)
The biggest challenge to detecting and predicting IUU activity has to do with IUU vessels going
dark, that is most "normal" vessels operating legally transmit their location to other vessels via
the Automatic Information System (AIS; Kroodsma et al. 2018). This is done primarily for vessel
collision avoidance and for search and rescue efforts. The trouble is that when certain vessels engage
in illegal activities, they typically turn off their AIS transponders or even falsify their location (this
is known as "spoofing"; de Souza et al. 2016). Looking across the globe there is a "global dark
fleet" operating in and amongst the world’s visible (legally operating) fleets (Sumaila et al. 2006)
committing all sorts of bad behaviors, starting with illegal fishing but extending to narcotics, human
and arms trafficking (Tickler et al. 2018). Most current approaches to detecting IUU fishing focuses
on identifying spoofing in AIS data (e.g. Ford et al. 2018), which has led to several recent advances
in our understanding of the global spatial distribution and possible scale of IUU fishing (Miller
et al. 2018). However, these spoofing analyses are almost always retroactive, revealing anomalous
behavior after they have occurred. To make predictions about where IUU activity might happen in
the future, at spatial and temporal scales relevant to enforcement, new approaches are required.
A major limit to current spoofing detection approaches is that they only analyze the anomalous
spatial behavior of vessels one at a time (e.g. Ford et al. 2018; Miller et al. 2018; Petrossian 2018).
In contrast, studies of anomalous behaviors in complex systems show that early detection (and
prediction) can be achieved through the analysis of multiscale patterns, that is a spatial anomaly
(for example) that starts with one actor, but then that spreads to others (Motter 2004). Identifying
contagious behaviors has aided the discovery of large and abrupt changes in financial markets (Gai
and Kapadia 2010), ecosystems (Levin 1998) and our bodies (e.g. the onset of an epileptic fit say;
Litt and Echauz 2002). In the context of IUU fishing, the key conceptual advance is to acknowledge
that any one vessel is embedded in a complex spatial system comprised of all the other vessels in
its proximity. The expectation is that the spatial behavior of a given vessel is determined by their
major objectives (e.g. moving from A to B, finding and catching fishing, etc.), but also by the
proximity and behavior of nearby vessels. If a nearby vessel goes dark and commits an illegal act,
then those nearby legally operating (and visible) vessels may respond anomalously, for instance,
they may move in such a way as to avoid any trouble.
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For early detection and prediction of IUU fishing, this means not just looking for anomalous
behaviors of any one vessel (i.e. our current abilities to detect spoofing), but in analyzing the
anomalous behavior of whole fleets. A useful analogy is to visible matter in the universe, whose
movement through space is in large part determined by unobserved dark matter. On the seas, the
movement of visible fleets is determined in part by the actions of unobserved dark fleets. Thus, an
approach based on the analysis of anomalous multiscale spatial patterns of visible fleets, as they react
to nearby but unobserved vessels committing illegal activities, could result in an entirely new way
to detect and even predict IUU fishing. Our goal here was to develop such an approach, analyzing
AIS data using new multiscale anomaly detection algorithms inspired by similar approaches applied
to complex systems. We applied our algorithms to vessel location data for the Patagonia shelf, a
highly productive fisheries region, and reveal anomalous precursor signals for several IUU events in
the area. These results offer a promising new path to pre-empting illegal behaviors at sea, with the
ultimate goal of diminishing IUU activity worldwide, and achieving the Sustainable Development
Goal 14: Life Under Water.
METHODS
In order to develop new algorithms for detecting and predicting IUU fishing, we synthesized AIS
data for a specific region of the world – the Patagonia Shelf (see Figure 1 for a map of the region).
The Patagonia shelf is one of the world’s most productive areas for fisheries, and fleets from all
over the world come to harvest many species (Bisbal 1995). Major fisheries include the illex squid,
southern blue whiting and blue grenadier / hoki fisheries, and fleets that dominate the region include
those from Argentina, the UK (through the Falklands Islands), China, and Spain. Indeed, in the
last decade or so, the presence of Chinese fishing fleets has increased substantially (in line with their
Ocean Silk Road initiative; Sutter 2012). Along with increased fishing in general, the Patagonia
Shelf has also experienced increased incidences of illegal fishing, in particular by Chinese fishing
vessels. There have been a number of high-profile incidences where Chinese fishing vessels have
been found to be fishing illegally, for example by the Argentine navy, and then either chased and
even destroyed. To develop new abilities to detect and predict IUU activities, the Patagonia shelf
and these few high profile IUU events serve as important case-studies with which to develop the
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new methodology.
Fishing Vessel Location Data
Global AIS data for the period 2016-2018 were obtained through Global Fishing Watch1. AIS data
were originally designed for collision avoidance at sea; vessels equipped with an AIS transponder
transmit their position and vessel identification data, such as maritime mobile security information
number (MMSI), call sign, ship type, speed and course over ground, and other information to ships
nearby carrying similar transponders as well as to receiving ground stations and low-orbit satellites.
Signal transmission frequencies vary with speeds between a few seconds and a few minutes. These
high-resolution tracking data are synthesized by ORBCOMM, which were then obtained through
Global Fishing Watch. For this analysis of IUU fishing, we subsetted these global data spatially to
the Patagonia Shelf (Fig. 1) and temporally to specific historic IUU events in this area (see Table
1 for a description of these events).
The AIS data required significant "cleaning" for it to be useable. Specifically, a significant
fraction (12-20%) of vessels were found to spoof their locations. That is specific vessel locations were
observed to "jump" unrealistic distances, indicating anomalous AIS reporting. Another observed
issue was multiple (non)unique identifiers (MMSI) reporting across the region (i.e. the impossible
case where the same vessel is in two locations at the same time). To remove these erroneous data
points, vessels with speeds greater than 32 kilometers per hour were removed. This threshold was
calculated as the 99th percentile of the vessel speed distribution calculated over the whole region for
the whole year of 2016. Vessels reporting locations on land, at a port or zero kilometers from shore
were also removed from the data, as well as vessels that did not travel more than one kilometer per
day. The remaining data were then interpolated to an hourly time-step to remove the intermittent
reporting times by vessels. Although these cleaning steps removed a sizable fraction of the original
data, for each IUU case-study on the Patagonia Shelf, there remained a usable number of vessel
locations (see Table 1, last column).
1https://globalfishingwatch.org/datasets-and-code/
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Multiscale Fleet Spatial Behavior
To quantify changes in the spatial behavior of entire fleets, we first calculated the "relationship"
between vessels as simply their distances from one another. More specifically, for a given time (i.e.
an hourly time-point in the processed data), for each vessel, the Haversine distance was calculated
to all other vessels in the area (Fig. 1A; for clarity lines identify the nearest three vessels). Overall
vessels and for a given time, this results in an NxN Haversine distance matrix, where N is the
number of vessels in the region. From this distance matrix, a probability density function (PDF) is
computed using kernel density estimation (e.g. see Fig. 1B). Overall time periods, this leads to a
set of between vessel distance distributions, each summarizing the multiscale spatial organization of
fishing vessels on the Patagonia shelf at a given time. These distributions hold an incredible amount
of information that we utilize to develop spatial anomaly indexes indicative of IUU activity.
To monitor the spatial organization of fleets over time, as they potentially respond to nearby
illegal activities, we imagine a situation in which a real-time analysis is required. As new AIS
data is made available, there is a need to compute a spatial anomaly index for that time period.
To allow for this, we perform a retrospective analysis wherein for a given leading time period, it’s
between vessel distance distribution is compared with those from a specific lagged time period. This
lagged time period is dependent on two factors: 1) the inherent memory of the system and 2) the
typical timescale of IUU activities. The former is important because marine social-ecological systems
are inherently non-stationary. As a consequence, an "anomaly" should be relative to a recent time
period. The latter is important because if too short a timescale is chosen then a relatively prolonged
period of IUU activity will be diagnosed as "normal". For the 2016 and 2018b IUU events, this
lagged time period was chosen as 8 days and for the 2018a event, 3 days. These choices were made
by iteratively exploring the results of our analysis and choosing time periods that best captured the
non-stationarity of the system, as well as the timescales of each IUU event.
Once the lagged timescale was chosen, each between vessel distance distribution was compared
with those from the respective lagged time period. This comparison was made using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) statistic, which measures the distance between two PDFs. The result is a set of
(lagged) KS statistics for each time period. To summarize this lagged information, we computed
various moments over these sets. In particular, we computed the mean lagged KS statistic per time
6
period, as well as the kurtosis. These each provide information about how anomalous a given time
period is based upon the geospatial organization of vessels in the region.
The last step is to compute the significance of these anomaly indexes. We do so by repeating
the calculation of the two anomaly indexes (the mean and kurtosis of the lagged KS statistic sets)
but for three null periods. These null periods are those immediately after the 2016 and 2018 IUU
events. They were chosen because they are the least likely to have IUU events: the challenge here
is to precisely identify times when no illegal activities were conducted, which is difficult because
reporting of illegal activities is not accurate, and we could not simply choose time periods at random.
As a consequence, we chose the periods after the 2016 and 2018 events because after the preceding
naval/coast-guard intervention, any further illegal activity would be highly unlikely during these
periods. With these null periods, significant anomalies were then computed as those greater than
the 99th percentile of the null distributions.
RESULTS
Between vessel distance distributions change over time (see Fig. 2A for the IUU event that occurred
in March 2016, where the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010 was caught fishing illegally and ultimately scuttled
by the Argentine coast guard, and 2B and C for results for the two other case studies in 2018).
Between vessel distance distributions generally have a mode at short spatial distances (<50 km;
this is identified by the red bands across time in each panel in Figure 2). This is the spatial scale of
local fleets, as can be seen on the map in Fig. 1A, which aggregate around specific fishing hotspots
(Sabatini et al. 2012). In addition to this local structure, there is spatial structure in the tails of
these between vessel distance distributions, and changes through time can be observed, potentially
revealing anomalous spatial behaviors in legally operating vessels (those that transmit AIS data) as
they respond to nearby vessels committing illegal fishing (Fig. 2; red lines denote the approximate
time of IUU activity). However, from visual inspection of these between vessel distributions through
time, it is not immediately clear if there is a spatial signature relating to IUU activity.
To quantitatively and objectively find a signal of IUU activity we compared every between vessel
distance distribution with those from a lagged set, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. The
lagged KS statistics through time, for each IUU case-study, can be seen in Figure 3. In each we
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see a strong signal of the IUU events: the KS statistic rises around the time of each event (Fig. 3,
black vertical lines), identifying that as these events occur, the spatial organization of vessels in the
region becomes quite distinct from previous times. Notably, there is nuance to these changes, with
the 2016 event producing a pronounced and relatively long period of elevated KS statistic values,
relative to the two 2018 events. Interestingly, this rise in the KS statistic in 2016 occurs after the
IUU event, whereas there appears to be an elevated signal proceeding the events in 2018, especially
2018a (Fig. 3B).
For every time period, the lagged KS statistic sets were summarized using the mean and kurtosis
moments. These define two spatial anomaly indexes (Figures 4 and 5 respectively). The mean
anomaly index identifies each IUU event quite clearly (Fig. 4): for each, there are elevated levels of
this anomaly index during the period of illegal activity. Interestingly, for the 2016 event the mean
anomaly index peaks after the reported date of 2016 IUU event; for the 2018a event, the anomaly
peaks approximately at the time of the IUU event, and for the 2018b event, the anomaly peak
occurs before the event. This suggests that anomalous spatial behavior can precede the ultimate
intervention of the illegal activity.
This is mirrored by the second spatial anomaly index: the kurtosis of the lagged KS statistic sets
(Fig. 5). This kurtosis anomaly index shows an even clearer precursor signal for all case-studies.
Furthermore, for the 2018b event this index identifies anomalous geospatial patterns in times well
before the period IUU activity. This is evidence to suggest that while the other precursor signals
might be indicative of the impact of a coast-guard intervention on the geospatial organization of
legally operating and visible fleets, these early-warning signals seen in 2018b may be indicative of
the response of the "good" vessels to that actual IUU activity committed by dark fleets.
DISCUSSION
To detect IUU fishing quickly, and even make predictions of where it is likely to happen, a new data
analytic approach was developed based on concepts from complex systems, specifically multiscale
anomaly detection. The approach uses a novel anomaly detection algorithm to identify spatial
behaviors exhibited by legally operating and visible (through the transmission of AIS location data)
vessels, as they respond to nearby illegal activities. Specifically, changes in between vessel distance
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distributions were quantified using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Then, a moving window was
used to emulate a real-time situation in which an anomaly index âĂŞmoments from the lagged KS
statistic setsâĂŞ is computed as new data arrives. Two anomaly indexes were explored: the mean
and kurtosis of the lagged KS statistic sets. These indexes identified anomalous periods, based on
the geospatial organization of vessels in the Patagonia shelf region, occurring before, during and after
the time of known historical IUU events. Importantly, precursor signals were identified, suggesting
the possibility that legally operating vessels do respond anomalously in response to nearby IUU
activity. This highlights an opportunity to advance predictive data analytics for IUU activities at
sea, globally and in near real-time, and not just retrospective analyses. This has immediate utility
marine conservation and fisheries management.
This method for IUU detection is distinct from other approaches, which have to date focused
solely on the spatial dynamics of vessels one at a time. In contrast, our approach makes use of
the spatial characteristics of whole fleets and assumes that any illegal activity will be revealed by
the anomalous spatial behavior of nearby vessels. The utility of this approach was verified for the
Patagonia Shelf, a highly productive and busy area for fisheries. We chose this area for a few
reasons: first, this area has experienced in the past and continues to suffer chronic exposure to IUU
fishing. Second, this is also a congested oceanic area, meaning that at any given time there are
numerous vessels both fishing, shipping and recreational operating in the area. This is important
because for our spatial anomaly detection algorithm to work, there needs to be vessels proximate to
the IUU event. This is, on the one hand, an opportunity, for most of the world’s fisheries operate
in only a fraction of the world’s oceans (albeit a large fraction), and recent work has shown that
in most of these fishing regions, there are often many vessels from numerous nations (Kroodsma
et al. 2018). However, this is also a major challenge, for there remain many areas of the world’s
oceans where IUU activity occurs in relatively isolated and remote locations. For example, recent
work has highlighted the high seas (i.e. areas far from the exclusive economic zones) as areas where
illegal activities occur constantly (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010). This means that there exists
a key spatial scale at which people/vessels do not react to nearby illegal activities, and at which
our spatial anomaly detection algorithm will cease to be useful. This spatial scale is yet unknown,
and will also be location and event specific, highlighting further need to examine the spatial and
temporal scales of the spatial behavior of vessels.
9
New and improved methods for detecting and predicting IUU fishing will help us achieve Sus-
tainable Development Goal 14 (life below water) in one major way; it will improve the accuracy of
our estimates of aggregate fishing pressure on fish stocks. Currently, impacts of IUU fishing can be
accounted for through indirect means (Pauly and Zeller 2016), and at coarse spatial scales (i.e. at
the scale of exclusive economic zones). Even though limited, results from these assessments suggest
that globally IUU fishing accounts for 20% of total fish catch (Sumaila et al. 2006; Shaver and
Yozell 2018). This information has motivated nations to combat illegal fishing, and the next step
is to improve the operational capacity for (maritime) law enforcement groups (i.e. coast guards)
through finer-resolution data products. Most current analyses of vessel location data provide infor-
mation on potential dark-fleet activity after it has occurred. In order to curb illegal fishing, and
as a consequence overharvesting of fish stocks, pre-emptive capacity is required. This is what our
analysis provides, and although only demonstrated for the Patagonia shelf for a limited number of
case studies, vessel location data are now global, and hence, there is an opportunity to monitor
anomalous spatial behaviors across the world’s oceans. Before doing so, two major caveats to note
are 1) we only performed our analysis on three incidences of illegal fishing, this is well below what
would normally be necessary to verify the accuracy and precision of an algorithm and 2) our ap-
proach does not confirm IUU activity, rather it is suggestive of dark fleet IUU activity, which can
be used to direct the attention of coast guards and navies for example.
An important benefit of our approach is that it requires only minimal spatial information,
specifically the algorithm only needs the location of vessels through time. Many current approaches
to detecting IUU fishing rely on additional information like the vessel Maritime Mobile Service
Identity (MMSI) number and the historical trajectory of vessels. While a relatively straightforward
goal, in practice it is very difficult tracking vessels from raw AIS data. Spoofing is rife (by our
estimates, the raw AIS data that we worked with included 12-20% of vessels spoofing daily through
changing their MMSI number). Methods have been applied to deal with this (e.g. Patroumpas et al.
2017), and some successes have been made, but it remains a challenge. Another route to detecting
IUU fishing is, once a dark fleet vessel has been identified (by their MMSI number say), to then
trace their spatial history and track them forward in time. The full spatiotemporal trajectory of
vessels reveals rich information about their past and present activities, and this has been used to
great effect to help in the detection of IUU fishing and can be used to capture dark fleet vessels
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when they come to port (Miller et al. 2016). However, there are again challenges to associating with
tracking vessels through time (primarily because of spoofing). Our approach needs none of this.
With simply the location of vessels in a given spatial region at a given time, we can infer anomalous
multiscale fleet behavior, which we show can be associated with illegal activities. This approach is
agnostic to vessel identity and a vessel’s spatial history. As a consequence, the information mined
from these data makes the least assumptions about the vessels and regions being studied and is
thus arguably more robust.
Monitoring the changing multiscale spatial behavior of fishing fleets has utility beyond detecting
and predicting illegal fishing. A variety of bad things happen at sea, including narcotics, arms and
human trafficking (Tickler et al. 2018). There is active slavery in many areas of the world’s oceans,
and geopolitical machinations are implemented through both official (naval) and unofficial actors
(e.g. fishing vessels; Fravel 2011). All these kinds of activities happen in and around vessels
operating legally by "good" actors. Furthermore, the level of information sharing and contextual
knowledge of skippers and crew on vessels is known to be high (Johannes et al. 2000), meaning that
they know what is happening around them. Harnessing this knowledge-capital is an opportunity for
dealing with maritime illegal activities broadly defined: given this analysis here of illegal fishing, it is
likely that other illegal activities committed by "dark vessels" will lead to some form of anomalous
spatial behavior in other nearby vessels. Indeed, it would be fascinating to create a typology of
anomalous spatial behaviors, with different archetypes associated with different illegal activities.
The typology could, for example, include descriptions of whether vessels group together, or spread
apart, or create spatial sub-modules, and if so, if there is a typical spatial scale of clustering. This
information could inform heuristics for faster identification of IUU activity; i.e. if observed fleets
are exhibiting spatial behaviors X and Y, then illegal activity Z could be occurring nearby.
An important and obvious next step in our approach to detecting and predicting IUU activity
is to improve upon the algorithm. Between vessel distributions do well at capturing the spatial
organization of fleets, however, there are many other ways in which this could have been done. From
a mathematical perspective, this simple first step is to put a metric/weight on the edges defining
interactions between vessels. Spatial distance is an obvious choice, but other metrics could have been
derived from correlations in heading or velocity for example. With different measures of association
between vessels, different spatial behavioral anomalies could be detected/classified. Furthermore,
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methods from the study of complex systems, specifically collective behavior in nature (Rosenthal
et al. 2015) and people (Cattuto et al. 2010), have used such measures of association between
agents comprising the system, in conjunction with dimensional reduction/denoising algorithms, to
identify signals of change otherwise lost in the noise (Jolliffe 2011; Coifman and Lafon 2004). These
approaches have been applied to big spatial datasets to find a signal of anomalous behaviors, and it
is likely a fruitful (and key) next step in the continued development of IUU detection and prediction
algorithms.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, combating IUU fishing is key to improving the sustainability of fisheries around the
world, and to secure the health of our oceans now and in the future. Important secondary outcomes
are diminished geopolitical tension and economic impacts on local economies. Current IUU mon-
itoring relies on detecting spoofing in vessel location records, which is retrospective and confined
to identifying anomalous spatial behavior of vessels one at a time. Both are useful but limited in
their ability to inform enforcement agencies like coast guards about the occurrence of IUU activity.
To overcome these challenges, we have developed an approach to IUU detection, and even predic-
tion, that examines the multiscale spatial behavior of whole fleets, those groups of vessels that are
visible and are legally operating, as they respond anomalously to nearby dark fleet activity. We
have shown that this approach identifies consistent precursor signals of IUU activity for a number
of known IUU events on the Patagonia shelf, as well as clear identification of the ultimate interven-
tion by the coast-guard. This is a promising new tool for detecting, predicting and deterring IUU
fishing. Future research will focus on expanding the analysis to other geographic regions, and for
other illegal activities, not just fishing, for example, narcotics trafficking and piracy. If the "good"
vessels and fleets continually exhibit anomalous multiscale behaviors across regions and events, then
it is possible to create near real-time and global indicators of IUU activity, broadly defined. This
new information will improve enforcement of maritime laws, and ultimately the sustainability of
our seas.
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Table 1: Description of Patagonia Shelf IUU Events
Date Fleetsinvolved Context Data
March
15, 20161
China,
Argentina
A Chinese fishing vessel, the Lu Yan
Yuan Yu 010, was fishing in Ar-
gentina’s exclusive economic zone.
The Argentina Navy fired warning
shots which resulted in the Chinese
fishing vessel attempting to crash
with the Navy vessel. The Argen-
tine Navy opened fire and sunk the
vessel. Four members were rescued
by the Navy while the others were
rescued by other Chinese fishing ves-
sels.
The time scale includes observa-
tions from March 1 - March 31
2016 and the spatial scale isolates
the ocean region outside of Puerto
Madryn along the Argentina coast.
The final subset of the data pro-
vides 749 unique vessels in 1.263
million square kilometers (1,000.76
km x 1,262.30 km) from March 1 -
March 31 2016 for a balanced panel
of 2,786,280 observations.
February
2, 20182
Spain,
Argentina
A Spanish fishing vessel, the Playa
Pesmar Uno, was intercepted by the
Argentina Navy for illegally oper-
ating in Argentina’s EEZ which re-
sulted in a heavy fine.
The time scale includes observa-
tions from January 15 - February 15
2018 and the spatial scale isolates
the ocean region outside of Puerto
Madryn along the Argentina coast.
The final subset of the data pro-
vides 777 unique vessels in 1.263
million square kilometers (1,000.76
km x 1,262.30 km) from January 15
- February 15 2018 for a balanced
panel of 2,983,680 observations.
February
21, 20183
China,
Argentina
The Argentina Navy warned a Chi-
nese Fishing Vessel, the Jing Yuan
626, to halt because they were op-
erating inside their exclusive eco-
nomic zone. The vessel ignored the
warning and escaped into interna-
tional waters. Additional Chinese
fishing vessels attempted to collide
with the Navy vessel to intervene in
the chase. The Argentina Navy was
unable to capture the Chinese fish-
ing vessels and issued orders for the
capture of the five vessels.
The time scale includes observa-
tions from February 5 - March 10
2018 and the spatial scale isolates
the ocean region outside of Puerto
Madryn along the Argentina coast.
The final subset of the data pro-
vides 828 unique vessels in 1.263 mil-
lion square kilometers (1,000.76 km
x 1,262.30 km) from February 5 -
March 10 2018 for a balanced panel
of 3,378,240 observations.
1 www.cnn.com/2016/03/15/americas/argentina-chinese-fishing-vessel/index.html
2 www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14093&ArticleId=2450374
3 www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-china-fishing/argentina-calls-for-capture-of-five-chinese-fishing-boats-idUSKCN1GK35T
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Figure 1: The map shows the location for each vessel on March 15, 2016 at 12PM, with lines connecting nearest five
neighbors (chosen for visual clarity). This highlights the spatial network of interactions defining a complex fisheries
system. B) A between vessel distance distribution (km) for all vessels. These between vessel distance distributions
are used to characterize the multiscale spatial organization of fleets operating in this region. Essentially, changes in
between vessel distance distributions reveal IUU events.
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Figure 2: Between vessel distance probability density functions (color scale) through time for three time periods
where illegal fishing occurred on the Patagonia shelf: 2016, 2018a and 2018b (see Table 1 for details of these events;
red lines in each panel). These between vessel distance distributions have a distinct mode at short distances. This
identifies the scale of local fleets in the region. But there exist other minor modes too, identifying smaller fleets
operating in the region. Notably, these distributions change shape over time. These changes in the multiscale
geospatial organization of vessels in the region can be used to identify anomalous behaviors indicative of illegal
activities.
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Figure 3: A moving window is used to compare a given time period, based on its between vessel distance
distribution (the horizontal axis), with those from a specific lagged period (the vertical axis). The comparison is
made using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic (i.e. the color scale). The KS statistic essentially captures how
different a given time period is, based on the geospatial organization of vessels, compared to other lagged times. For
each IUU event (black vertical lines), we observe an increase in the lagged KS statistic. This highlights that the
geospatial organization of vessels in and around an illegal activity is relatively anomalous.
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Figure 4: Moments from the lagged KS statistic sets can be used to create anomaly indexes. Here, the mean
lagged KS statistic is plotted over time. For each IUU event (vertical red lines) this anomaly index peaks immediately
before, during and after the events. "Significant" anomalous times (red markers) are identified by comparing values to
those created from null periods where IUU activities were suspected to not have occurred. These significant anomalies
again all fall on the times when IUU events occurred, highlighting that this method can be used to identify when
these kinds of events occurred. Importantly, precursor signals are observed, suggesting that predicting IUU activities
may be possible.
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Figure 5: Moments from the lagged KS statistic distributions can be used to create anomaly indexes. Here,
the kurtosis of the lagged KS statistic sets is plotted over time. "Significant" anomalous times (red markers) are
identified by comparing values to those created from null periods where IUU activities were suspected to not have
occurred. This anomaly index reveals strong precursor signals before all IUU events. This signal may be indicative
of the naval/coast-guard intervention, but potentially more powerful, it may also be indicative of IUU activity itself,
especially in (B) the 2018a case-study, where the precursor anomalies occur well before the intervention.
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